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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
PROPER VENUE OF ACTIONS UNDER NON-
RESIDENT MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTE-
AND SIMILAR PROVISIONS OF
AVIATION ACT
Alcarese v. Stinger'
The appellee defendant, a non-resident motorist, had an
automobile accident in Cecil County. Appellant plaintiff
thereafter instituted a negligence action in the Circuit
court for Harford County. Service on the non-resident
defendant was secured pursuant to the provisions of the
Maryland statute which provides for local suits against
non-resident motorists for accidents occurring within this
state.' The lower court, dismissing the action on the ground
that it lacked geographical jurisdiction (venue), held that
the suit should have been filed in the court in Cecil County
where the accident occurred, 3 or in Anne Arundel County,
the locale of the Secretary of State (through whom service
of process was effected under the provisions of the non-
resident motorist statute.)
On appeal the lower court was reversed, the Court of
Appeals holding that since the non-resident motorist statute
makes no provisions as to venue of suits filed under its
provisions and further since the general venue statute of
the state was not applicable, 4 a plaintiff suing in Maryland
for an accident in this state involving a non-resident motor-
vehicle owner may proceed in any court in the state which
he may see fit to select.
Although the constitutionality of the non-resident motor-
ists statute is now well settled,5 this is the first time the
question of venue as such has arisen. However, a writer
of a leading article in the Maryland Law Review in com-
menting on this problem stated:"
178 A. 2d 651 (1951).
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 66%, Sec. 113.
aIn this particular case it is of interest to the reader to learn that the
Harford County attorney who filed the case for the plaintiff had been re-
tained by the plaintiff's Mississippi counsel a very short time before the
3 year limitation period had expired. Accordingly, the Harford attorney
brought the action in Bel Air, county seat of Harford County, rather than
waste any more time by going to Elkton, the county seat of Cecil County,
where the cause of action actually accrued.
4Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 158.
5Assurance Corp. v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 181 A. 436 (1935); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
1 Mullen, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists for Suits Arising from
Local Accidents, 1 Md. L. Rev. 222, 229 (1937).
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"The Maryland law makes no provision as to the
venue of suits filed under its provisions, and in the
absence of such a provision, it is submitted that a per-
son suing in Maryland for an accident in this state,
involving a non-resident motor vehicle owner, may
proceed in any court in the state which he may see fit
to select. Certainly, this has been the practice in pro-
ceeding under the Maryland Statute."
In each of three cases which have reached the Court of
Appeals, the accident occurred in one county, while suit
was brought in another county. However, in no case was
the question of venue raised.7
At common law all causes were originally termed local
because they had to be tried by a jury acquainted with the
facts of the dispute. In those days a jury was a witness
to facts as well as a judge of them. Too many defendants,
however, took advantage of this situation by fleeing the
neighborhood and venue of the locale, thereby effectually
terminating the case against them.' The converse of mak-
ing all actions transitory was found to be an ineffectual
solution, however, for in cases involving the title of land
or questions of waste or damage to a free-hold, an equitable
decision could not be made except at the locale of the land
itself. Accordingly, the common law developed the two
separate types of action - local and transitory - with
their respective venue qualifications. They are still appli-
cable today in Maryland, except where modified by statute.'
In all actions involving title of land, the venue is said to
be local and the case must be tried in the jurisdiction where
the land lies.10
It is with transitory actions, however, that we are
mainly interested in this case. In Alexander's British
Statutes, we find some interesting as well as pertinent
In the case of Assurance Corp. v. Perkins, supra, n. 5, the accident
occurred in Anne Arundel County while suit was filed in Baltimore City.
In the case of Wagner v. Scurlock, 166 Md. 284, 170 A. 539 (1934), the
accident occurred in Anne Arundel County while suit again was filed in
Baltimore City. In the case of Associated Transport, Inc. v. Bonoumo, 191
Md. 442, 62 A. 2d 281 (1948), the accident occurred in Howard County
while suit was brought in Baltimore City. Any objections to venue, not
having been appropriately raised, were waived. Howell v. Bethlehem-
Sparrows Point Shipyard, 190 Md. 704, 711, 59 A. 2d 680 (1947), and
cases cited.
Loftus v. Penn. R.R., 107 Oh. St. 352, 140 N. E. 94, 96 (1923).
Philips v. City of Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 433-4, 72 A. 902 (1909).
10 Supra, n. 9; See also Hesselbrock v. Burlington County, 111 N. J. L. 177,
168 A. 45 (1933).
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points on venue.1' "Where the action might have arisen
in any county it is transitory and generally the plaintiff
may in England lay the venue wherever he pleases, though
the court possesses the power of changing it if not laid
where cause of action arose."' 2 Under the common law, a
transitory action such as a negligence suit can be instituted
in any county in which defendant can be served with pro-
cess and defendant has no right to insist that it shall be
tried in the county in which it arose.13
If there were no general venue statute in Maryland
today the court would have found no trouble in deciding
the case and could have fallen back on the old common
law rule, that if a cause of action is not local (i.e., if it
could have arisen in any place or county) it is termed
transitory and suit may be brought in any county or juris-
diction where defendant may be found.14 However, Mary-
land does have a general venue statute 5 which governs
venue in our state wherever applicable. It provides in sub-
stance that in all transitory actions a defendant who is a
resident of Maryland shall be sued either in the county
where he does business or in the county in which he resides.
It further provides that in an ex-delicto action where all
the defendants are not residents of or engaged in business
in the same county they may be sued where the cause of
action arose.
Although recent decisions interpreting provisions of
this statute have been liberal to the extent that they have
refused to disallow service because of narrow interpreta-
tions of its various provisions, it seems impossible to con-
strue it in such a way as to encompass the non-resident
parties in the instant case.' 6 Obviously, under the present
circumstances, since all parties are non-residents of the
State as well as county, and none do business or are em-
ployed in the State, it is not possible to apply the general
venue statute. Judge Collins, speaking of the general venue
statute for the Court of Appeals, said: 17
"It was merely an arbitrary designation by the
legislature of the county in which the suit might be
brought at the plaintiff's election under such applicable
situations."
"Alexander's British Statutes (Coe's Ed.), Vol. II, p. 659.
"CHITTY's ED. OF BLAOKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, Vol. II, p. 228.
State, Use of Allen v. Pittsburg & Conellsville R.R. Co., 45 Md. 41 (1876).
,56 Am. Jur.; Venue, Secs. 3, 8.
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 158.
See Suit v. Shailer, 18 F. Supp. 568 (D. C. Md., 1937).
, Supra, n. 1, 653. For the general venue statute, see ns. 4, 15, supra.
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The case law in other states, regarding the venue pro-
visions of non-resident motor vehicle statutes, is as different
and varied as their statutes are many.i8 The multitude of
differences in the individual enactments naturally give rise
to many conflicting and distinguishable decisions on the
exact point governing the venue of actions in cases involv-
ing non-resident motorists."9 In states whose statutes are
similar to Maryland to the extent that they contain no
specific venue provisions, the courts have varied in their
approach to the problem. In the case of Bergstedt v. Neff,'20
we find the Court designating venue at the county where
the Secretary of State is domiciled or in the county where
the injury occurred, while in Carter v. Schackne, 1 the
Court held the statute intended to fix venue at plaintiff's
residence. In the case of Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 22 the Georgia court permitted the action
to be brought in any county in the state.
In summary, the decision in the instant case seems to
follow the line of rather liberal decisions which the Court
of Appeals has handed down while construing the non-
resident motor vehicle statute. The Court is inclined not
to permit narrow technicalities to interfere with adminis-
tration of the law regarding the liability and responsibility
of non-resident motorists. This is unquestionably in the
best interest of the citizens of the state and is a model
which other jurisdictions might well follow.
In the light of the instant case, the act of our legislature
allowing for service on non-resident owners or fliers of
aircraft presents an interesting point. This Statute, 3 in-
corporates the provisions of Article 66/2, sec. 113, providing
for service on non-resident motorists, merely making the
changes in wording necessary to relate itself to airways
and air service, and specifically states, "Service shall be
made in the same manner and with the same consequences
provided for service of non-resident motor vehicle owners
See an extensive and particularized annotation in 115 A. L. R. 893.
BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA oF AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTIc, Vol. IX, Part I,
Sec. 5817, pp. 49-50.
20 17 F. Supp. 753 (D. C., W. D. La., 1936). See also Bouchillon v. Jordan,
40 F. Supp. 354 (D. C., B. D. Miss., 1941), which limits venue to the county
where the Secretary resides.
173 Tenn. 44, 114 S. W. 2d 787 (1938).
2190 Ga. 633, 10 S. E. 2d 46 (1940). See also Highway Steel and Mfg.
Co. v. Kincannon, 198 Ark. 134, 127 S. W. 2d 816 (1939). In 1947 the
Georgia statute was amended so as to require a non-resident plaintiff to
bring suit in the county in which the cause of action arose, while a resident
plaintiff was given an election between the county where the cause of action
arose and the county of his resident. Ga. Ann. Code, Sec. 68-803.
MMd. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 159.
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or operators in Article 662, Sec. 113 (a-f) inclusive." There
is, however, an additional paragraph found in this Statute
which does not appear in the non-resident motorists law.
It reads - "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 158,24
in any action against the owner or operators of aircraft
growing out of any injury to the person or property of a
Maryland resident occurring in Maryland, which results
from operation of said aircraft, suit may be brought in the
county in which such injury occurred."'2 5
Although this paragraph would seem to provide for an
additional venue in which to bring an action in relation to
the terms of Maryland's general venue statute, it seems
possibly to have a limiting effect when viewed in relation
to the decision of the instant case. Under the general venue
statute a transitory action against a Maryland resident
may only be brought at the defendant's residence or place
of business; under the airplane venue statute there is added
the place where the injury occurred, but under the instant
case an action in the non-resident motorists case can be
brought anywhere in the state.
In view of the instant decision, if the legislature wishes
to continue the theme of consistency with the non-resident
motorists law in the airplane venue statute it might be
desirable to modify the latter either by striking out the
words - "Suit may be brought in the county in which such
injury occurred" and inserting "Suit may be brought in
any county of the state" or else merely by striking out the
language altogether, leaving it for the Court of Appeals to
follow the opinion handed down in the instant case.
With the constant increase of air travel it would seem
to be a rather logical conclusion that the air accident rate
will rise proportionately and the same social compulsions
arising from the modern highway destruction rate will to
a lesser degree be present to impel this State to allow those
injured by air accidents the maximum amount of protection
for their suffering and loss.
There is only one possible reason in policy in restricting
venue for suits against non-resident airplane owners to
the county where the cause of action arose and that might
be the temptation of an unscrupulous plaintiff to bring suit
in whichever county a jury would be most likely to return
the highest verdict. However, this practice would be much
more likely to spring up if at all in the case of negligence
S"upra, us. 4, 15.
Italics added.
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actions involving automobile owners. Inasmuch as the
Court of Appeals has just extended the venue of the non-
resident motorist suits to allow plaintiffs to bring action in
any county, they apparently felt that the public interest
was best served by allowing the injured plaintiff every
help and convenience in bringing his suit. It follows there-
fore that since the only sound obstacle to allowing suit to
be brought in any county was overridden in the case of
motor vehicle accidents, where it was a very considerable
barrier, it should not be allowed to obstruct a defendant
in an airplane accident case, where the likelihood of such
misuse is infinitely less, if and when such case arises for
decision.
However, in the interest of certainty as to legislative
intent, it would seem desirable to amend both statutes, so
that they clearly express on their face the venue for such
suits as the legislature desires it to be, in the light of the
instant case and considerations which it may suggest.26
If permitting venue in any county as was done by -the Court of Appeals
is considered to be too broad, a venue provision clearly permitting suit
either where the cause of action arose or where plaintiff is a resident or
has a usual place of business would seem to give the plaintiff a fair choice
and to cause no substantial hardship for the defendant. See the Georgia
amendment, supra, n. 22.
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